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and more vital. When, by the dispersion, the Jews were compelled to dwell among other nations, they must have reflected upon the concessions which they were called upon to make to the peculiarities of other nations without giving up those of their own. Hence originated the prefaces to the Talmud, which calls itself the hedge about the law. This tendency to compromise in the Talmud is the inner transition of national to cosmopolitan monotheism.

It is only when the antithesis of ethnicism and monotheism is held fast that Christianity can be rightly apprehended in its historic genesis. Christ sprang from the Jewish and not from the Roman race. All the elements of error in Christianity are a relapse either into abstract substance or abstract subject, into abstract naturalism or abstract spiritualism, into Gnosticism or Ebionism, into heathenism or Judaism. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that the phenomena of the Christian religion ever oscillate between two extremes, for these, in and for themselves, make up its higher unity, and by these, conversely, it first becomes perfectly understood.

It cannot be made a matter of reproach that, as a philosopher, Hegel did not enter upon the history of Christianity in the Philosophy of Religion, for this he did not do for other religions, because, before all else, it devolved upon him here to arrive at their conception. This, however, was amply done in the History of Philosophy and in the Philosophy of History.

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## SHAKSPEARE'S COMEDY "AS YOU LIKE IT."

By D. J. SNIDER.

In this drama we see placed in striking contrast the actual and the idyllic world. The former contains society, state, business, and their manifold interests and complications; the latter is the simple pastoral existence without care, struggle or occupation, and almost without want. The former is the world of Reason and exhibits man in his highest rational development, and for this very cause has within it the deep-

est and most terrific contradictions. The loftier the summit, the greater the fall; the more highly organized a society is, the mightier are the collisions slumbering or struggling in its bosom. But an idyllic existence is almost without contradiction, and hence it happens that men sometimes flee from a more concrete social life in order to get rid of its difficulties, and betake themselves to the simple state of the shepherd.

More commonly however they remain in society, but construct with the aid of imagination a world of their own, suited exactly to their notion of things, whither they can flee out of the rugged and disagreeable reality surrounding them. Such a realm may be called the ideal as distinguished from the idyllic, though both have the same fundamental principle, since they are abstractions from actual existence. An imaginary world of this kind has always been a favorite theme with a certain class of minds, particularly with the poets and theologians. But in some social conditions, especially in periods of revolution and disintegration, it is the resort to which all intelligence flees, and the construction of ideal societies becomes a phase of national consciousness. Such a state is generally thrown back into the distant past long antecedent to history, when man was absolutely innocent, and even the lower animals shared in his condition. That is, the negative side of man and nature is wholly eliminated, thought away. Of this character was the Paradise of the ancient Hebrews and the Golden Age of the ancient Greeks. It will be noticed that there is a great advantage in placing this world in the past, since we are thus continually receding from it, while, according to the well-known law of distance, it is increasing in enchantment to the spectator. But more hardy spirits have dared to project this world into the future, where it is in danger of being overtaken. Still the Millennium has thus far always kept a thousand years ahead, and it is likely to do so for an indefinite time to come.

Now this consciousness so general, so deeply grounded in human nature, the poet proposes to make the subject of a comedy. That it is capable of a comic treatment is manifest when we reflect that the very realization of the ideal world must be its annihilation, for then it is real and no longer

ideal. Thus the pursuit of such an end as absolute and final is contradictory and null in itself, since it must terminate in just the opposite of that which is sought. Now comedy exhibits the individual pursuing ends which are nugatory, and therefore destroy themselves in their realization. That the poet had this consciousness in mind is clear from his allusions to Robin Hood, the English ideal hero of the forest; and still more plainly does the same fact appear when he speaks of "those who fleet the time carelessly as they did in the golden world," an obvious reference to the Greek ideal realm. To this latter he likens the Forest of Arden, a comparison by which he lets us know what he means by that forest.

But it is through an analysis of the drama that the purpose of the poet can be best revealed. To its entire movement there belong three parts: first, the real world of wrong, in which the individual is assailed in his personal rights; secondly, the ideal world to which the individual flees in order to get rid of injustice; thirdly, the restoration of the individual to his existence in society, the real world of right. Yet these divisions, it must not be forgotten, are merely the phases of one and the same process.

We shall now glance at the incidents of the play and trace this movement through its various parts. The first act brings before us in completeness the real world of wrong. Orlando has been deprived of his share in the paternal estate by his brother Oliver, and, what is much worse, his education has been utterly neglected, in violation of the will of his father. Here is shown the wrong in the Family, but this is not all. The rightful Duke has been expelled from his government by his brother, and thus we see that the wrong extends into the State. The play does not unfold but rather presupposes these two great acts of injustice, and hence society is portrayed as in a condition of strife and contradiction. But Orlando has developed his physical nature, though his intellect may have been neglected; he exhibits his prowess first against his brother, and then at court he overcomes the Duke's wrestler. A curious result of this adventure is the love which springs up between himself and Rosalind, which however has received the most ample and beautiful motive

from the poet. Nowhere has he more successfully shown the budding, blooming, and ripening, of the tender passion.

But soon this world of injustice comes into full activity, and manifests its inherent character. The Duke, as the violator of all individual right, must naturally become jealous of all individuals; hence he has banished a number of lords who seemed dangerous to his power. And so this process must continue as long as anybody is left in the country, since the existence of one man must be a continual source of fear to such a tyrant. Hence Orlando, as the son of an old enemy, excites his suspicion, and has to leave the court with precipitation. The same suspicion is aroused against Rosalind, the daughter of the banished Duke, who is also driven off in the most wanton manner, but is accompanied by the daughter of the usurper, a just retribution upon his own family for the wrong done to his brother's. Here is introduced the disguise of the two ladies, which furnishes the occasion of the main comic situations of the play.

But the wrongs of Orlando do not end with his departure from court. He returns to his brother's estate only to find his life conspired against there, and his condition more hopeless than ever. Accompanied by his trusty servant Adam, a second time he betakes himself to flight. It is impossible to mistake the meaning of these scenes. The poet has here portrayed society in contradiction with its fundamental object; it has driven off those whom by every tie of blood and of right it was bound to protect; both State and Family have become instruments of the direst injustice; on all sides we behold the *world of wrong*. Such is the first part of the movement of the play.

But whither must these people go? Society has banished them, has wronged them, and hence their object is to find a place where the injustice of society does not exist, where there is no civil order. Such is the Forest of Arden, into which we are ushered in the beginning of the second act. Its nature has already been sufficiently indicated by the poet when he compared it with the Golden Age. Its logical character is determined by the fact that it is the negation of all social organization, that simple primitive state before society. Moreover we find already here the banished Duke and Lords,

those for whom the social contradictions were too strong, and hence have betaken themselves to a less complex existence. The Duke rejoices in the new situation; he makes a glowing contrast between their present life and that which they have abandoned; here is no flattery, no ambition, no crime; he can find quite all the advantages of society in the trees, the stones, and the brooks; nature, were she only looked into, can furnish all the content of reason. Nothing can surpass the freshness and the idyllic beauty with which he describes their life in the forest; the aroma of the country is in every line. Then comes Amiens, the lyrist of the company, who embodies these sentiments in the most ethereal song. The poetic representation of their abode is thus complete. But hold! a disagreeable contrast arises. The Duke feels that even in this new life he has not wholly avoided the old difficulty, for there still remains the struggle with the animal world, the burghers of the wood, for physical maintenance. Nay, there is one of these Lords who cannot find here any solution of the trouble, who declares that injustice is as rife in the Forest of Arden as in society; witness the slaughter of the innocent beasts of the field, and that same usurpation of their domains by the banished Duke and Lords, of which they themselves were the victims in society. This is Jaques, whose negative character can find repose nowhere; he even sees in Nature herself only discord and evil; the deer is as bad as man—it leaves its wounded neighbor to perish while it passes haughtily on. Thus is our idyllic world, from which we had thought to shut out all negation, disturbed by its reappearance, like a ghost among children. Indeed man can hardly get rid of the negative in this way; though he flee to the woods, he will find it there; in fact, his very existence depends upon destruction, upon swallowing a certain amount of vegetable and animal existence. Hence, in order to get rid of the negative, he must first get rid of life. Such is the logical result of abandoning state and society with the design of seeking a solution of their contradictions—namely, suicide—a result which men seldom insist upon practically realizing, though it is not unknown in the history of the human species that such has been the case.

These persons the play presupposes to have already gone

to the idyllic realm, but now behold the new arrivals. First, Rosalind and Celia, in their disguise, appear at its entrance. Their difficulties, weariness, and hunger, are specially noticed; they find the transition from the Real to the Ideal, from the luxury of the court and conveniences of society to the meagre life of the shepherd, by no means easy. Though they are in an ideal world, the Real makes itself very unpleasantly felt. But the nature of the place is soon made manifest. Two beings suddenly rise upon their view, natives of the land, whose appearance shows them to be shepherds. Moreover their language assumes a poetical form, and has for its theme the wail of unrequited love. Also their names sound quite familiar, are in fact some old stereotyped names of pastoral poetry. With one of them Rosalind enters into conversation, and the result is that the new-comers buy a shepherd's hut, and are firmly planted in the idyllic land. Strange to say, Orlando and his old, devoted servant Adam have arrived in another part of the same territory, a proceeding which seems at first somewhat arbitrary on the part of the poet. Yet whither else had they to go? They have fled society, and hence must proceed to a place where social order is unknown, which place has been identified as the Forest of Arden. We also find that they have the same difficulty on entering this realm which was experienced by the last party; Orlando even thinks of violence in order to obtain food, but he is soon changed by the gentle manner of the Duke, who of course could not do harm to any human being. With the end of the second act we find everybody fairly established in the new country.

The next question which arises is, what are they to do here? What is to be the content of their lives? We are not long left in ignorance, for soon we find Orlando wholly occupied with Love, carving the name of his fair one upon the bark of trees, making love-ditties and hanging them upon the bushes; in fine, consumed with the most intense passion. Nor is Rosalind much better off, though she preserves her disguise in his presence. Touchstone the clown, too, becomes infected with the prevailing frenzy, and the native shepherd Silvius, who is also heart-stricken, is again introduced together with the disdainful shepherdess Phebe, who in her turn falls in love

with the disguised Rosalind. The result of the third act is that we have three pair of lovers, native and foreign, to whom one pair is added in the following acts. Thus our ideal realm is for the new-comers transformed into a sort of love-land, where the young people seem wholly occupied with their passion, though the old-comers are not so affected. That such an existence should take this form is in the natural order of things. Let us analyze this remarkable transition. Man without society is without content to his life. Here society exists not, business is impossible, ambition in the state is cut off, the physical wants are reduced to the smallest compass and are satisfied with the smallest amount of exertion. Without occupation, without incentive, in general without content to his life, man is reduced to the *natural individual*. Thus left alone to himself, his finitude begins to show itself in every direction. For man, single, is one-sided, a half, as is manifest by reflecting a moment on the sexual diremption. He is thus the half, yet would be the whole, and his entire nature drives him to overcome the contradiction. For in truth he is not himself, his existence is in and through another, namely, one of the opposite sex. Such is the feeling of love, for it is here not conscious, not in reflection, but the impulse of the natural individual to cancel his own finitude. Now we have just seen that this natural individuality was quite the sum of pastoral life, and hence its chief content is love. Thus the poet is true to the character of this realm when he makes those who dwell in it totally occupied with the tender passion.

But there is another consequence of this life which the poet has not neglected. We see here the origin and the content of the idyl. Pastoral poetry in its native simplicity is mainly amatory, and allows but little reflection, which belongs to a more cultivated period. Moreover it is here that poetry begins as the simplest expression of the primitive human passion. The Imagination gains absolute control and paints the loved one in the fairest colors; the stricken shepherd sees in the bush, in the flower, in the clouds, her fleeting form; all nature is turned into the image of her shape, love is his whole being. When man thus transmutes his existence into forms of the Imagination and gives them expression, the result is



poetry. It does not seem a forced interpretation when it is said that Shakspeare meant to indicate the nature and the presence of the poetic element by the introduction of the native shepherds, Corin, Silvius, and Phebe. Their language falls at once into verse, their theme is some collision of love, and their names are taken from the pastoral poets. Moreover Shakspeare has introduced, perhaps, the most common theme of this species of poetry, the neglected lover and the disdainful shepherdess. In fact, it occurs twice; Phebe disdains Silvius, and is herself disdained by Ganymede. Certainly the greatest charm of pastoral poetry is this simple idyllic love, springing from nature direct, without a shadow of formality or conventionality. Description of rural scenery and of pastoral manners is quite subordinate to the amatory element; but when reflection enters, or allusions to a more complex social organization are brought in, the pastoral loses its native relish without attaining the higher forms of poetry. This play is not, therefore, a pastoral drama in the sense of the "*Aminta*" or the "*Faithful Shepherdess*," both of which do not get beyond the shepherd's life, while here the pastoral element is merely a transitory phase of both poetic and social development. Such is the second part of the movement of the play.

But what is the outcome of the drama? The complication, which rests wholly in the disguise of Rosalind, is solved by her appearance in woman's clothes, and the four pairs are united in the presence of the Duke. Hymen is thus the magician who reconciles these collisions of love-land, and the result of the pastoral world is Marriage, the Family, which again results directly in society. So viewed on this side, the ideal word cancels itself, passes over into a system of social order; the four pairs, who quite represent the various classes of people, make already a little state. But the banished Duke and Lords cannot thus return out of their idyllic existence, for it is supposed that they are too old for passion, or have previously entered the family relation. It is the State which has driven them off, and through the State they must be brought back. So the poet introduces a new, and of course the true, motive for their return. The world of wrong, of which the usurping Duke is the representative,

must continue its assaults upon the individual, since it is based upon the destruction of personal right; the result must be that soon a majority, or, if injustice be carried to its extreme logical end, all the people will be driven off to the Forest of Arden where the rightful Duke resides. In such case the idyllic realm is at once converted into the same state from which they have fled, lacking only the soil and the usurping Duke. But the return must be complete, must be to the old territory. Hence the usurper is made to repent when he sees that he is deserted, and the old ruler and his attendant lords are restored *peacefully*—an important point, for it would ill comport with their peaceful character and their simple, unoffending life in the woods to come back by violence. Thus the reconciliation is complete, harmony is restored, the world of wrong dissolves of its own accord, the world of right returns with the rightful Duke. The diremption with which the play begins is now healed over, the ideal world being the means whereby the regeneration takes place.

It will be noticed, however, that there is one of the company who does not return. Jaques is the completely negative character, who believes in society as little as in anything else. Even the Forest of Arden called forth in him only sneers; it was as bad as the court and possessed the same unjust features; hence it had no mediation for him. He finds a fool in the forest whose nonsensical moralizing calls forth in him the wildest delight; he thinks the fool is the only wise man, and he himself wants to turn fool to reform the world. Here we have a sample of not a few of our modern reformers, who of all people are themselves most in need of reform. He snarls at all reality, apparently for no other reason than that it is; the moment anything becomes actual, it becomes bad; mere existence is sufficient for condemnation. It does not surprise us, therefore, when it is hinted that this reformer has himself waded through the depths of sensuality, and travelled over the whole world in search of something positive, which of course he cannot find. He is hence wholly negative; man and even nature are to him worthless. He does not return, therefore, with the rest, but goes to the new convert, the Duke's brother, who has now "left the world" in

his turn, but whose career in the world was also negative. Jaques is one of those psychological characterizations of Shakspeare which are true to the most rigid logic, yet are so completely vitalized that we never feel the abstraction. Such is the third part of the movement of the play.

To sum up: this drama gives an exhaustive statement and solution of the problem of the Real and Ideal. First comes the struggle of the individual with the actual world, whereby he is trampled into the dust, his rights taken away, his life endangered. It becomes the real world of wrong and destroys that which it was called into existence to protect, and thus has the contradiction within itself which must bring about its destruction. Secondly, the individual therefore must flee, abandon state and society, which oppress and try to destroy him, and go—whither? Not to another state, for the thought in its universality is that the State as such assails him; hence he must find some spot quite out of its reach. The simple primitive life must, therefore, be sought; hence he betakes himself to the woods—the Forest of Arden—where only a few scattered shepherds eke out a scanty existence. Thus the individual is established in his ideal realm far away from the conventionalities and contradictions of society, in simple unity with nature and the beasts of the field. But, in the third place, this mode of life is found to be of very short duration, is hence not a true and permanent condition of the human race. There arises simultaneously a twofold movement for its dissolution. On the one hand, the members of this ideal land are still natural individuals, hence must love, and, what is more, must marry; thus the Family appears, which again in good time brings forth the State, and the ideal realm vanishes into thin air. On the other hand, the real world of wrong continues its warfare with the individual, until it drives all away into the Forest of Arden; for its principle is the destruction of the individual, who has of course to flee. The ideal land thereby is converted into the old state minus the tyrant, since the citizens of the one have become inhabitants of the other. So by a double process this realm cancels itself and passes into the higher form of civil and social organization. The poet, therefore, indicates that such an idyllic life is an irrational abstraction; that man's rational

existence is in the state and society, whose collisions he must endure, bitter though they be. The absurd notion that a pastoral, dreamy existence is the highest finds here no toleration. Such is the lesson for life; but the poet's work cuts deeper, since it includes the literary and artistic products of the same consciousness. All those ideal commonwealths of which literature is full may here obtain their final judgment. But particularly the nature, extent and limits of pastoral poetry, the art-form of such a life, are brought out with a hey-dey of laughter. For this species of poetry also must end with the entrance into society; it belongs only to the simple shepherd on his native hills; it is the first and least concrete, and hence least interesting of all poetry, being without the presupposition of society. The course of the drama, therefore, is the contradiction in the world of reality which results in the wrongs done to the individual; the mediation is through the ideal world, whereby a reconciliation is brought about and the individual is restored to the reality. The three steps may be generalized as the Diremption, the Mediation, and the Return. They exhibit a totality of society with its corresponding art and a hint of its literature.

Some have considered this play to be a mere caprice, a wild and irregular sport of fancy. But, if we have succeeded in our interpretation, we have shown it to be an inherent and necessary development out of one fundamental thought. Again, it has been taken for a pastoral drama. But its very aim, its comic germ, is to show the limits of pastoral poetry—in fact, of idyllic life generally—and consequently of the poetic form which springs from such a life. Still more frequently it is held to be an ordinary comedy of situation, of intrigue and love, as if the incidents connected with the disguise of Rosalind were alone to be considered. It has undoubtedly a pastoral element, it has also intrigue; but both are subordinate, are only means to bring forth the grand result. It is thus a comedy within a comedy, or rather two comedies within a comedy. The pursuit of an idyllic life calls forth the pastoral, the love gives the basis of the intrigue. But the third and highest comic element is to be found in the return to society, in the fact that these people of the ideal realm are in reality doing just the opposite of

what they think they are doing—they are trying to accomplish ends which are in themselves contradictory and null. In general this play may be called the comedy of the Imagination as against the Reason, or of the abstract Ideal as against the Actual, wherein the Imagination in pursuing an object is at the same time destroying it. Its content thus reaches deep into the history of the world. All visionary commonwealths, Plato's Republic, More's Utopia, Harrington's Oceana, Arcadias, Icarias, Atlantises, etc.; also, many of the so-called ideal lives, paradisiacal societies; in fine, the whole consciousness upon which such bodiless creations of fancy repose,—constitute the theme of this drama and are exhibited in their finitude.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

In the last number of this journal we introduced correspondence and discussion on the subject of proofs of immortality. We postpone until some future number a continuation of the discussion in order to make room for the following interesting matter.

EDITOR.

### *The Causal Nexus.*

[The following very able treatment of the psychological question involved in the subject of causality we have received from Dr. Brinton.—Ed.]

#### AXIOM.

A cognition can only be known by a difference between itself and a related cognition.

#### SIGNS.

$A B$  = a simple sequence, causal or not.

$A \therefore B$  =  $A$  is the cause of  $B$ .

—  $A \therefore B$  =  $A$  is *not* the cause of  $B$ .

## PROPOSITIONS.

### THEOREM I.

In a simple sequence, without other cognitions, no causal idea can arise.

Let  $A B$  be a simple sequence, without other cognitions. Be it supposed, first, that  $D \therefore B$ ; hence —  $A \therefore B$ . But the cognition of this relation cannot arise, as (*per axioma*) it requires the cognition  $D$ , and, *ex hypothesi*,  $D$  is unknown. Be it supposed, secondly,  $A \therefore B$ ; but, as (*per axioma*) this cognition can only be known by the cognition that any —  $D \therefore B$ , and, *ex hypothesi*, this is unknown; hence, neither the idea  $A \therefore B$ , nor —  $A \therefore B$ , can arise.